|  
            
		         Where an institutional head is required to act judicially he must observe 
		          the principles of fundamental justice. The court held these principles 
		          to mean  
		        that the inmate affected must be fully informed of 
		          the disciplinary offence he is alleged to have committed, that he be given 
		          a fair opportunity to present his CaSt and the evidence relevant to matters 
		          he is called upon to face, and that the decision of the institutional 
		          head be arrived at judicially upon material properly before him and not 
		          capriciously or in reliance upon some consideration not relevant to the 
		          charge.107  
		        In Beaver Creek the prisoner's lawyer 
		          had argued that the superintendent's action infringed the provisions of 
		          section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights which requires a fair hearing in accordance 
		          with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of a 
		          prisoner's rights and obligations. In response to this argument the Ontario 
		          Court of Appeal held that, on its interpretation of the Penitentiary Act, 
		          where the civil rights of a prisoner may be affected by the decision of 
		          an institutional head, there must be a fair hearing in accordance with 
		          the principles of fundamental justice, and thus there was no conflict 
		          with the Bill of Rights. In other words, the interpretation placed on 
		          the Penitentiary Act by the court in relation to decisions affecting the 
		          civil rights of a prisoner were as restrictive on the actions of an institutional 
		          head as the provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights. By necessary implication 
		          the court held that section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights was inapplicable 
		          to administrative decisions not affecting a prisoner's civil rights.  
		        On its face, the Beaver Creek case seemed 
		          to create substantial impediments to the plaintiff's arguments in McCann 
		          that confinement in SCU must be preceded by a hearing in accordance with 
		          the principles of fundamental, justice. Was not such a decision an administrative 
		          one affecting merely the 'place and manner of confinement' and hence non-reviewable? 
		          The plaintiffs in McCann demurred to this 
		          implication of Beaver Creek by pointing 
		          out to Mr. Justice Heald that in defining which prison decisions affected 
		          a prisoner's civil rights (thus requiring a fair hearing) and which did 
		          not, the Ontario Court of Appeal did not have before it any detailed evidence 
		          of the nature of those prison decisions and their impact on prisoners' 
		          lives. Mr. Justice Heald had had the benefit of over three weeks of extensive 
		          evidence on these matters and, the plaintiffs submitted, was in a better 
		          position than the Ontario Court of Appeal to draw conclusions as to whether, 
		          in light of the prison reality, a particular decision affected the civil 
		          rights of a prisoner.  
		        Given this premise, the plaintiffs in McCann 
		          went on to point out several problematic features of the Ontario Court 
		          of Appeal's classification of prison decisions in light of the reality 
		          of the federal penitentiary system. In Beaver 
		          Creek, the court was quite prepared to consider a decision involving 
		          corporal punishment as judicial because of its impact on the prisoner's 
		          right to personal security. The court saw it as punishment upon 
		          the person as compared to punishment of the person such as, in its view, 
		          would be involved in the alteration of locale or nature of confinement. 
		          However, the plaintiffs submitted that the evidence of the effects of 
		          solitary confinement which had been presented to Mr. Justice Heald left 
		          no doubt that dissociation of the kind the plaintiffs had endured had 
		          a massive impact on a prisoner's right to personal security. The difference 
		          between a strapping and confinement in SCU is the difference between a 
		          physical impact and a psychological impact on personal security. The plaintiffs 
		          contended that in terms of its enduring quality, confinement in SCU left 
		          a far more indelible imprint on them than the purely physical imprint 
		          of the strap. The plaintiffs reminded Mr. Justice Heald of the evidence 
		          of Dr. Korn and Dr. Fox: 'The evidence simply is that if you keep people 
		          long enough, they will engage in self-torture, simply to focus the pain 
		          ...Physical pain which is definite, which they can control, is much more 
		          bearable than the torment they can neither understand nor control.'108 
		         
		        A second functional limitation of the Beaver 
		          Creek classification concerned the approach of the Ontario Court 
		          of Appeal to the concept of liberty. That approach was that upon the passing 
		          of sentence, the prisoner, for the period of his lawful confinement, loses 
		          all his rights to liberty. Liberty was seen here as an all-or-nothing 
		          proposition; one is either 'free' by being out of prison or 'unfree' by 
		          being in prison. The plaintiffs submitted that this is not in accord with 
		          the realities of prison life. That reality is that even after the fact 
		          of imprisonment, ~ prisoner retains a certain freedom of mobility and 
		          communication while in the general population of the prison. As one commentator 
		          put it, 'there is a significant quantum of institutional and traditional 
		          liberty to which every inmate remains entitled while incarcerated.'109 
		          The plaintiffs called Mr. Justice Heald's attention to the qualitative 
		          change from confinement in the general population to confinement in the 
		          SCU and to Dr. Korn's evidence that the prisoner's placement in administrative 
		          segregation 'is the most fateful decision in his prison life.'110 
		          The plaintiffs contended that the decision to place a man in SCU so dramatically 
		          affected the nature of his imprisonment, so dramatically curtailed his 
		          institutional freedom, that it is required to be made on a judicial basis. 
		           
		          In the absence of any other Canadian decision on the issue of when procedural 
		          fairness must be accorded in prison decision-making, the plaintiffs submitted 
		          that it was relevant to look at the case law that had been developing 
		          in the United States. A comparative inquiry, they argued, was particularly 
		          valid because many of the cases had been preceded by extensive trials 
		          in which the details of prison life and prison decision-making had been 
		          laid before the court, and because the legal issue before the American 
		          courts had been essentially the same as the one urged on Mr. Justice Heald: 
		          which prison decisions have such an important impact on a prisoner's life 
		          that they must be preceded by a fair hearing?  Page 2 of 8
            |