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          I was in the warden's office when Beth Parkinson phoned him, and he
        invited me to stay and listen on the speaker phone to their conversation.
        Ms. Parkinson read out the segregation notices of three of the prisoners,
        Darryl Ghostkeeper, Ron Tessier, and Mike Miller. Mr. Tessier's and Mr.
        Ghostkeeper's notices contained exactly the same wording: "alleged involvement
        in illegal drugs and/or extortion." Mike Miller's referred merely to illegal
        drugs. In Ms. Parkinson's opinion, these notices did not meet the requirements
        of the   CCRA,   as they did not give the prisoner
        sufficient information to meet the case against him. As she put it, "All
        a prisoner can say in relation to these allegations is that they're not
        true." In her view, what the institution should have provided in relation
        to any prisoner's alleged involvement with drugs was the date on which
        the incident was supposed to have happened and the information on the
        type of drugs, the amount of drugs, and things of that nature. Warden
        Brock explained that the action had been taken because there were indications
        of rising tension in the institution in the form of assaults on staff
        and prisoners and the increased use of brew and drugs; he had segregated
        these prisoners on the basis of information that they were the principal
        instigators. He told her that the allegations would be evaluated individually
        and that this work would start on Monday.
          Ms. Parkinson reminded him that under the   CCR
        Regulations,   segregation review notices with sufficient information
        had to be served within one working day of prisoners being placed in segregation
        (which was the following Monday). If the men in question were to be seen
        by the Segregation Review Board on the following Thursday for their mandatory
        five-day reviews, the   Regulations   required
        prisoners to receive three working days' notice of any material to which
        the Segregation Review Board would refer; this meant that that information
        also must be provided by the following Monday. She asked the warden to
        confirm that the information would be given to the prisoners on Monday;
        the warden said it would.
          After this telephone conversation, the warden talked to me about the
        difficulty of balancing legal requirements with the responsibility to
        manage a safe institution. He said that if dynamic security -- information
        flow and effective communication between staff and administration -- had
        been operating properly, the IPSOs would have had properly documented
        files to provide information to these prisoners as to why they were being
        segregated. The reality was that this work had not been done, and clearly
        there was a gap in the information-collection process at Matsqui Institution.
        In effect, the warden was confirming my impression of the method used
        at the tracking meeting, which was to identify the prisoners first, then
        ask questions to fill in the gaps later.
          Another observation I would make in assessing the warden's perception
        that Matsqui was in a phase of escalating tension and increasing violence,
        is that the two major incidents he cited could be seen more appropriately
        as evidence of a different phenomenon: that is, the breakdown of some
        operational systems of staff and management. Following the attack by one
        prisoner on another with a weight bar, which had occurred the week before
        the Boileau incident, it was revealed that the staff had received information
        that this prisoner, while on parole, had assaulted the common-law wife
        of the prisoner who was alleged now to have assaulted him; this first
        prisoner should, therefore, never have been placed in the living unit.
        Had this preventive action been taken, there would have been no assault.
        One of the institutional psychologists shed further light on the attack
        on Mr. Boileau by Mr. McLaren. The psychologist told me that Mr. McLaren
        had had three different case management officers in the last two months,
        all of whom were supposed to do the paperwork necessary for his parole
        hearing. The first was someone who had just been made a case management
        officer and had proved not up to the task. He was replaced by someone
        in an acting position who had also not done the necessary work. She in
        turn was replaced by Mike Boileau, who had been in the job for only three
        weeks when the incident took place. Mike Boileau himself told the psychologist
        that he could well understand why Mr. McLaren was upset and that he had
        good reason for being so. This, of course, did not justify Mr. McLaren's
        assault. But if the system had operated the way it was supposed to, Mr.
        McLaren's paperwork would have been done in a timely manner, and the assault
        would not have taken place. Both incidents, in other words, were preventable
        and isolated, and really did not speak directly to the level of violence
        at Matsqui Institution as a general phenomenon. Yet both incidents had
        been used as evidence of the heightening of the biorhythm, to use the
        warden's metaphor, which had to be topped to reduce it to a lower and
        more tolerable level.    Page 2 of 2
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