As it does with the IONSCAN, the Correctional Service of Canada also
places heavy reliance upon positive hits made by drug dogs. As with the
IONSCAN such reliance can ride roughshod over visitors' protestations
of innocence of any involvement with drugs. A case that arose at Mission
Institution in 1998 is illustrative. On August 29, 1998, while Mrs. Martineau
was visiting her husband, the drug dog handler reported to the IPSO that
the dog indicated that Mrs. Martineau had the odour of narcotics on her
person. Mrs. Martineau agreed to submit to a strip search or any other
procedures the institution wished to conduct to demonstrate that she was
not in possession of any drugs but her requests were rebuffed. Subsequently,
she explained to the institutional authorities that she had allowed her
son to use her car shortly before her visit to Mission Institution and
that he had now admitted to her that he had smoked a joint in the car.
That explanation made no difference to a three month ban on open visits.
As I have described earlier in the book, it was Mr. Martineau's case in
the 1970s that resulted in the judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada
that correctional decisions must be made in conformity with the duty to
act fairly. In her letter to the Visits Review Board Mrs. Martineau ably
described the manner in which the suspension of her open visits with her
husband contradicted what she had come to understand as fundamental principles
of justice.
The Board is making decisions based on a belief that
I was carrying narcotics. During my detainment and interrogation I requested
many times that [the IPSO] or the RCMP do whatever procedures they felt
necessary to prove that I was not in possession of narcotics. They refused.
This now leaves me in the position of being treated as though I were guilty,
yet I was given no chance to prove my innocence. In the outside world
where I hold a responsible professional position, own my own home, and
do everything else an ordinary Canadian citizen does, a person is innocent
until proven guilty. I was disgusted to find that within the world of
Corrections Canada, a person is guilty on suspicion, with no opportunity
to prove his/her innocence. If your mandate is as you stated and
[the IPSO] had suspicions that I was carrying contraband, then why wasn't
everything possible done to find out the truth? I signed a document when
I first started visiting which stated that I would submit to any procedures
necessary to a contraband investigation, and I asked repeatedly and emphatically
on August 29 that these procedures be carried out. Why weren't they? Is
it easier for the Visitor Review Board to make decisions based only on
suspicion? What about the truth? I know longer feel safe as a citizen
visiting the Institution because my right to be innocent until proven
guilty has been violated, and I am perceived as something very different
than what I am.
The seam of injustice revealed in the Martineau
case, as with the other cases I have reviewed in this chapter, are closely
linked to the lack of an impartial and independent forum in which the
reasonableness of the Institution's case for restricting important legal
visiting rights is tested. Under the present procedures, visit review
boards treat IONSCAN readings and drug dog reactions as irrefutable evidence
of guilt, albeit only in an "administrative" sense of the word, and there
is little that prisoners (or in rare cases, their lawyers) can say to
defeat this presumption of administrative guilt. Furthermore, as illustrated
by the Wilson case, where a challenge is made to a restriction on visits,
it usually comes too late in the day to provide any relief from the imposition
of the administrative sanctions. My review of Visit Review procedures
at Kent reveals further evidence of the casual disposal of legal rights,
redolent of the pre- CCRA regime in which
visiting was a privilege. There is little talk at visit review boards
of "rights-based discourse" and what little there is typically drowned
out in the countervailing talk centred on the War on Drugs. The fact that
the initial decisions on visiting status and the restrictions on open
visits are made in the absence of the prisoner, compromises the fairness
of the process and the prisoner's participation in a subsequent review
of the decision hardly compensates for the initial unfairness. A strong
bias for institutional concerns further dilutes fairness because of the
heavy reliance on information provided by the IPSO's office which, based
upon my observations, is often presented as a set of conclusions about
suspected drug involvement and passes uncritically into the decision of
the review board.
The injection of an Independent Chairperson into the deliberations of
the visit review board would, as with segregation review, provide the
necessary counterweight to these preferences and practices. The introduction
of Independent Chairpersons would help bring visit reviews into a culture
of rights as opposed to privileges. It would ensure that all relevant
information has been reviewed and shared with the prisoner and their visitor
prior to the review; guarantee that reviews are conducted with the full
participation of the prisoner and visitor; require that any information
put forward to support a restriction on visits is assessed for its reliability;
impartially review the credibility of all evidence and place the appropriate
burden on the administration to justify any restriction on visiting rights.
Under a system in which independent adjudication was in place there would
be very low tolerance for cases being deferred because, as so often happened
at Kent, a month after a prisoner's transfer, files have still not been
received from the transferring institution; there would not be a reflexive
deference to IPSO information; IONSCAN and drug dog hits would not be
assumed to be irrebutable proof of drug involvement, and the visit review
process could not be so easily hijacked for strategic objectives such
as the National Drug Strategy, without regard to procedural and substantive
due process. Page 8 of 8
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