|   The umbrella of legality under which Kent Institution segregated Mr.
        Martineau in December 1994 would have provided scant protection had Mr.
        Martineau’s segregation continued and a legal challenge been mounted in
        the form of a   Martineau (No. 3).   Both the
        process and the substance of Mr. Martineau’s segregation were deeply flawed.
        In terms of process, he was not given written notice prior to his five-day
        review of the information that the Segregation Review Board would be considering;
        indeed, at no time during his segregation, until December 29, was he personally
        told anything beyond the fact that there was an ongoing investigation.
        In terms of substance, the legal basis invoked by the institution for
        Mr. Martineau’s segregation was s. 31(3)(b); this required the institutional
        head to believe on reasonable grounds that Mr. Martineau’s continued presence
        in the general population would interfere with an investigation. The basis
        for those reasonable grounds, as explained by Deputy Warden Sexsmith on
        December 29, thirteen days after Mr. Martineau had first been segregated,
        was received information that Mr. Martineau had arranged for the transmission
        of Mr. Flamond’s carving knife through a prisoner intermediary to the
        prisoner who ultimately carried out the attack, coupled with Mr. Martineau’s
        "conspicuous absence" from the unit when the attack took place. But in
        an environment where virtually every prisoner has access to a knife, for
        either defensive or offensive purposes, how reasonable is it that Mr.
        Martineau would construct a long chain of involvement to pass a knife
        along to the perpetrator of the offence? The issue of reasonableness must
        also be sifted in the context of the close personal relationship between
        Mr. Martineau and Mr. Flamond. As to Mr. Martineau’s "conspicuous absence"
        from the unit at the time of the stabbing, how reasonable was the conclusion
        that this provided grounds to implicate him, given that he was in the
        prison chapel for the purposes of participating in a scheduled Brotherhood
        meeting? In any event, whatever reasonable grounds might have existed
        initially for believing that Mr. Martineau was implicated in the attack,
        or that his presence in the population would interfere with the investigation,
        had evaporated by December 29, on the deputy warden’s own admission. The
        five-day delay in Mr. Martineau’s release was to satisfy the dynamics
        of institutional politics; clearly, leaving a prisoner in segregation
        to avoid ruffling the feathers of unit managers is not authorized by the
          CCRA.  
          When the veils of legality are stripped away, the underlying rationale
        for Mr. Martineau’s segregation becomes more apparent. As one of the unit
        managers candidly conceded, Mr. Martineau’s power base in the institution
        was becoming a problem. He had openly called into question the unit managers’
        interpretations of   CCRA   provisions regarding
        Aboriginal prisoners and had held them to account in front of national
        and regional representatives. Furthermore, he had successfully invoked
        the assistance of the warden and the deputy warden to bring to fruition
        the Brotherhood’s Christmas give-away plans. Placing Mr. Martineau in
        segregation for Christmas and New Year's Day, thereby precluding his participation
        in the Christmas social and all but eclipsing his long-awaited visit with
        his wife, was both a symbolic and a real message about who was in charge
        at Kent Institution. That message had little to do with the provisions
        of the   CCRA   or the pronouncements of the
        Supreme Court of Canada on the duty to act fairly. Page 4 of 4
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