Beyond the Ken of the Courts
The statutory framework in which responsibility for the conditions of
confinement and the treatment of prisoners was broadly delegated to penitentiary
officials was buttressed by the reluctance of the courts in Canada (as
in the United States and England) to review the decisions of prison officials
in response to challenges by prisoners to inhumane conditions or unfair
treatment. The court's role was to enforce legal rights; since prisoners
were seen as persons without rights, their complaints were necessarily
beyond the ken of the courts. This rationale for what has been called
the "hands-off" doctrine was later supplemented by an additional argument,
that "judicial review of such administrative decisions [would] subvert
the authority of prison officials, the discipline of prisoners, and the
efforts of prison administrators to accomplish the objectives of the system
which is entrusted to their care and management" (Note "Beyond the Ken
of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints
of Convicts" [1963] 72 Yale Law Journal
506 at 509).
The persistence of the hands-off doctrine in the United States has been
described in this way by John Dilulio:
As late as 1970, judges played a negligible role in
the administration of prisons. For most of the previous two centuries,
prisoners were "slaves of the state." A prisoner was beaten for minor
rule infractions, worked mercilessly, starved, forced to live in filth,
and made to suffer cruelties and hardships. Little or no help could be
expected from the bench. Wardens were the sovereigns of the cell blocks,
free to do pretty much as they wished with the incarcerated citizens in
their charge. For prisoners, the Constitution was a locked door, and the
protections of the Bill of Rights were hidden from sight. (John J. Dilulio,
Jr., "Introduction: Enhancing Judicial Capacity," in John J. Dilulio,
Jr., ed., Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution:
The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails [New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990] at 3)
An early Canadian example of the judicial hands-off doctrine can be
seen in the case of R. v. Huckle
(1914) 23 C.C.C. 73 where a prisoner filed a habeas
corpus application in the Ontario High Court claiming that his
time in custody was lengthened as a result of his loss of remission for
violating institutional rules. His argument was that since he had not
been furnished with the Penitentiary Regulations, he could not be bound
by rules the existence of which he was not aware. The court rejected his
claim as being based upon a "fundamental misconception"
It is argued that the reward of remission or the forfeiture
of remission must be on some proceeding in the nature of a trial so that
the convict may be heard. This is clearly not what is contemplated by
the Act. Someone must determine whether
the conduct of the convict is exemplary. Prima facie the warden and officers
of the prison must discharge this duty. Their conduct will be subject
to review by the Minister; but the statute surely does not contemplate
a controversy in the courts over a question of prison discipline." (at
74-75)
In Prisoners of Isolation, I suggested
that the effect of this hands-off approach was "to immunize the prison
from public scrutiny through the judicial process and to place prison
officials in a position of virtual invulnerability and absolute power
over the persons committed to their institutions" (at 82). It is a telling
commentary on the state of prisoners' rights in Canada that in my first
study on prison discipline, conducted in 1972 at Matsqui Institution,
I could cite only a single case in which a Canadian court had ruled that
prison disciplinary proceedings, under certain restrictive conditions,
could be subject to judicial review.
By the early 1970s, the insulation of prison justice from public and
legal scrutiny was increasingly showing serious fault lines. These lines
made their appearance in a series of escalating episodes of individual
and collective violence, the product of both deteriorating prison conditions
and a rising expectation by prisoners, as human rights became increasingly
important outside the prison, that they could no longer be treated as
persons without rights. In 1971, Kingston Penitentiary experienced one
of the bloodiest riots in its history. Five staff were taken hostage,
and a small group of prisoners, mostly sex offenders, were placed in a
circle in the prison dome and brutally tortured; two of the prisoners
died, and part of the institution was destroyed. Mr. Justice Swackhamer,
in his anatomy of the riot, identified the absence of meaningful rehabilitation,
the lack of any effective prisoner grievance system, and the entrenched
hostility between staff and prisoners. The depth of that hostility was
reflected in the aftermath of the Kingston Riot. Because of the extent
of the destruction at Kingston, the newly constructed Millhaven Institution
opened prematurely in May 1971, and over four days (instead of the planned
six months) a large number of prisoners were transferred to Millhaven.
The reception they received there was equally unplanned. As described
by Mr. Justice Swackhamer:
We find that on [Wednesday] 10 to 12 custodial officers
had been stationed in the southerly portion of P corridor, each armed
with a riot stick . . . The officers positioned in P corridor were directed
to stand some five feet east of the westerly corridor wall and approximately
eight feet apart. We can only conclude that the objective and the result
of such positioning of staff was to ensure that no inmate could pass through
the corridor out of range of a riot stick. We find that on Wednesday,
when the inmates left the buses and proceeded down P corridor, either
singly or in pairs, substantial numbers of them were assaulted by officers
standing either on the platform or in the corridor. In short, we find
the inmates in the course of admission to the penitentiary were in this
way required to run "the gauntlet." ( Report of the
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Disturbances at Kingston Penitentiary
during April 1971 [Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973] [Chairman:
J. W. Swackhamer] at 34) Page 1 of 2
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